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I. 
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 Fan Wang, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 
obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States 
on April 29, 2010, and worked as a trading assistant in a 
financial services firm.  In 2011, without authorization, he 
purchased oil futures contracts using the firm’s trading 
account and transferred those contracts between firm 
accounts.  In company records, Wang marked these contracts 
as closed (sold) when they were, in fact, still open.  
  
 After the firm discovered the transactions, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation arrested Wang.  The one-count 
indictment alleged that, upon discovery of a loss of $2.2 
million, the firm sold the contracts.  Wang pleaded guilty to 
violating the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by Making a 
False Report in Connection with a Commodities Transaction 
in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(B) and § 13(a)(2).1  The 
court sentenced Wang to three months in prison, with three 
years supervised release, and ordered him to pay $2.2 million 
in restitution. 
 
 The Attorney General initiated removal proceedings 
on March 19, 2015, charging Wang with removability by 
classifying his conviction as an aggravated felony under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 
                                              
1 7 U.S.C. § 13(a):  “It shall be a felony punishable by a fine 
of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for not more 
than 10 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. 
. . (2). . . knowingly to violate the provisions of section 6, 
section 6b. . . .”  The focus of the analysis here will upon 
Section 6b(a)(1)(B) (Commodity Exchange Act § 4b). 
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237(a)(2)(A)(iii).  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).2  The 
Immigration Judge ordered Wang removed on June 4, 2015, 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.  Wang now 
petitions us to review the Board’s order, challenging its ruling 
that the District Court convicted him of an aggravated felony.  
For the reasons that follow we will grant his petition and 
remand the case to the Board. 
 
II. 
A. 
Although we have jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an 
alien who is removable by reason of having committed a 
criminal offense covered in section . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
[aggravated felony].”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We do, 
however, have jurisdiction to examine “constitutional claims 
or questions of law.”  Catwell v. Attorney General of the 
United States, 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Section 1252(a)(2)(D)).  Therefore, we have authority to take 
up the issue, using the de novo standard, of whether Wang’s 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony because it is “a 
purely legal question, and one that governs our own 
                                              
2 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) 
states:  “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony 
at any time after admission is deportable.”   
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jurisdiction.”  Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 
2002).3 
 
B. 
 For purposes of section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA, 
an aggravated felony includes crimes “[1] involv[ing] fraud 
or deceit [2] in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000.”  8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Wang disputes the 
Board’s ruling on both prongs.  His first challenge focuses on 
the language of the statute of conviction which reads:  “It 
shall be unlawful . . . (B) willfully to make or cause to be 
made to the other person any false report or statement or 
willfully to enter or cause to be entered for the other person 
any false record.”  Section 6b(a)(1)(B).  He is not properly 
categorized as an aggravated felon, he contends, because 
crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit” require materiality as an 
element of proof and Section 6b(a)(1)(B) lacks this element. 
 
 The Immigration Judge brushed aside Wang’s 
materiality argument.  He reasoned that Wang was properly 
classified as an aggravated felon because, under Section 
101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA, “deceit” was understood to 
include crimes of falsification—like Section 6b(a)(1)(B)—
without regard to materiality. 
                                              
3 We have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction, giving us 
the authority to analyze “whether an alien was convicted of a 
non-reviewable aggravated felony.”  Stubbs v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 452 F.3d 251, 253 n. 4 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 
2004)).   
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 On appeal, the Board affirmed the Immigration 
Judge’s removal order, but it moved the focus of its decision 
away from interpreting the INA and towards an analysis of 
the criminal statute.  The Board concluded that it was 
“unnecessary” in this case to decide if the INA required 
materiality because “all relevant portions [of Section 
6b(a)(1)] require materiality.”  Fan Wang, A088 152 814, 1, 3 
(BIA 2016).  Wang challenges both the Immigration Judge’s 
interpretation of the INA and the Board’s conclusions about 
Section 6b(a)(1)(B), but our review encompasses only the 
Board’s interpretation of the criminal statute.4 
 
 Whether Section 6b(a)(1)(B) requires proof of 
materiality, for purposes of the INA, is a matter of first 
impression for us.5  We use a categorical approach to analyze 
                                              
4 Since the Board rendered its own reasoned decision and did 
not comment on the Immigration Judge’s analysis, we review 
only the Board’s opinion.  Kaplun v. Attorney General of the 
United States, 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  We look to 
the decision of the Immigration Judge only to the extent that 
the Board adopted or relied upon it.  Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 
F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
5 Wang maintained that the Government waived this issue, 
but we are convinced that it is properly before us.  Wang also 
claimed that, since he was convicted in the District Court of 
the Southern District of New York, precedent of the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit controls our interpretation of 
the criminal statute.  However, even if we agreed with this 
premise, there is a dearth of decisional law that is directly on 
point. 
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the statute of conviction, examining only the elements of the 
offense to establish whether the petitioner committed a crime 
involving fraud or deceit.  Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 
478, 483 (2012).  We do not look at the facts underlying the 
crime committed by the petitioner.  Singh v. Attorney General 
of the United States, 677 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
 We look first at the words of the statute (United States 
v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 483 (1997); Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)), which are as follows: 
 
It shall be unlawful— 
 
2)  for any person, in or in 
connection with any order to 
make,  or the making of, any 
contract of sale of any commodity 
in interstate commerce or for 
future  delivery that is made, or to 
be made, on or subject to  the 
rules of a designated contract 
market, for or on  behalf of any 
other person; . . .  
 
 (A) to cheat or defraud or 
attempt to cheat or defraud  the 
other person; 
 
 (B) willfully to make or 
cause to be made to the other 
person any false report or 
statement or willfully to  enter 
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or cause to be entered for the 
other person any  false record; 
 
 (C) willfully to deceive or 
attempt to deceive the other 
person by any means whatsoever 
in regard to any order or contract 
or the disposition or execution of 
any order  or contract, or in 
regard to any act of agency 
performed, with respect to any 
order or contract for or, in the 
case of paragraph (2), with the 
other person. . . 
 
  (D)(i) to bucket an order if 
the order is either  represented 
by the person as an order to be 
executed, or is required to be 
executed, on or subject to the 
rules  of a designated contract 
market.  
 
Section 6b(a)(1).  Obviously, Section 6b(a)(1)(B) does not 
contain the word “material,” nor does it include the words 
“fraud” or “deceit,” but these last two terms are found in 
subsections (A) and (C), respectively.  ‘“When the statute's 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.’”  Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union 
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Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).  But the Board 
concluded it was necessary to refer to the common law to 
understand this subsection.  The Government supplements the 
Board’s reasoning by urging us to read Section 6b(a)(1)(B) as 
inextricably intertwined with the provisions that surround it.  
We see flaws in both analyses. 
 
 Picking up, in part, on the Immigration Judge’s 
reasoning, the Board emphasized the conclusion in 
Kawashima that Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA “refers 
more broadly to offenses that ‘involv[e]’ fraud or deceit—
meaning offenses with elements that necessarily entail 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.”  Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 
484.  Relying then on the common law of deceit, the Board 
concluded that Section 6b(a)(1)(B) is an aggravated felony 
because: 
 
[A]s understood at common law, 
‘deceit’ required that any false 
statement made be material.  
Thus, because the common law 
concepts of fraud and deceit 
required materiality, the 
materiality requirement was 
carried forward when concepts 
were codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a), 
prohibiting contracts designed to 
defraud or mislead. 
  
Fan Wang, A088 152 814, 5 (BIA 2016). 
 “We . . . presume that Congress incorporates the 
common-law meaning of the terms it uses if those ‘terms . . . 
 10 
 
have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common 
law’ and ‘the statute [does not] otherwise dictat[e].’”  Wells, 
519 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (additional citations omitted)).  But 
here, in order to incorporate the common law, the Board 
subsumes offenses of falsehood into crimes of deceit.6  Our 
precedent, however, grounded in Supreme Court decisions, 
acknowledges that the term “false statement” does not have a 
settled common law meaning and “does not imply a 
materiality requirement.”  United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 
195, 199 (3d Cir. 2009); Neder, 527 U.S. at 23 n.7; Wells, 519 
U.S. at 495.  Because of this, we ruled (in a circumstance in 
which the statute separated the terms “fraud” and “false 
statement” with a disjunctive) that it was not possible to 
conclude that violations of that statute always required proof 
of materiality.  Id.   
 
 The Government responds by pointing to the 
surrounding provisions of the CEA, encouraging us to 
understand Section 6b(a)(1)(B) as part of a package of 
                                              
6 In its examination of Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA, 
the Supreme Court noted in dicta that, at the time this section 
was enacted, “the term ‘deceit’ meant a [sic] ‘the act or 
process of deceiving (as by falsification, concealment, or 
cheating).’”  Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484 (quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 584 (1993)).  However, it 
did not reconcile this statement with Neder (527 U.S. at 23 
n.7) and Wells (519 U.S. at 495).  Moreover, this analysis is 
focused on the criminal statute, not the INA. 
  
 11 
 
intertwined provisions that must be read together.7  The 
Government also contends that the CEA provides an inherent 
point of reference for each subsection, which imputes 
materiality by prohibiting any fraud, false statements, or 
deceit that relates to a futures contract.  It points to a number 
of decisions from other Courts of Appeals that—they say—
have interpreted the statute this way.   
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said that 
“[l]iability attaches under 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a) when there is ‘(1) 
the making of a misrepresentation, misleading statement, or a 
deceptive omission; (2) scienter; and (3) materiality.’”  
United States Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. JBW 
Capital, 812 F.3d 98, 106 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United 
States Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise 
Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 981 (11th Cir. 2014) 
[additional citation omitted]).  Similarly, the Court of Appeals 
                                              
7 The Government asserted that since Section 6b(a)(1)(B) is 
part of the CEA, not the criminal code, Wells and its progeny 
(that prioritize examination of the statutory text) do not apply.  
The Government suggests that, in its place, we give greater 
weight to the broader statutory context of the provision and 
its legislative history.  As we noted above, we have 
consistently applied the principle that “where the disposition 
required by the text is not absurd” the statute should be 
enforced “according to its terms.’”  Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 559 
(emphasis added).  We are by no means suggesting that 
statutory context and legislative history are irrelevant to the 
analysis, but—as we explain infra—we see no reason, in this 
case, to diverge from the framework established in Wells that 
gives the greatest weight to the plain meaning of the words 
that Congress chose to write into law.   
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for the Tenth Circuit upheld a civil jury verdict of liability 
under Section 6b(a)(1), where the record established that, “‘in 
connection with’ an order of the sale of a futures contract, 
[the defendant] misrepresented material facts and executed 
unauthorized trades and that [a third party] relied upon 
[defendant’s] misrepresentations.”  Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation v. UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375, 1384 
(10th Cir. 1998).8  Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit said:  “The elements of a fraud action under § 4b are 
derived from the common law action for fraud.”  Puckett v. 
Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). 
 
 These opinions do support the notion that materiality is 
an element of proof in some cases brought under Section 
6b(a).9  But they do not ground a conclusion that this is true 
in all cases brought under this section.  Wang’s indictment—
which the Government characterizes as rare—is, nonetheless, 
                                              
8 In support of this point, the Government also cited United 
States v. Arrington, 998 F. Supp.2d 847, 865-66 (D. Neb. 
2014); aff’d sub nom. United States Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Kratville, 796 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2015).  
We note a similar ruling by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.  Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 
111 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 
9As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
“[t]he subsections are not entirely separate; a single action 
may violate more than one.”  United States Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (11th 
Cir. 1979). 
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evidence that each subsection can be charged separately.  
Therefore, the analysis in cases like UMIC and JBW might be 
persuasive in a case in which the crime involved false reports 
in combination with either fraud (Section 6b(a)(1)(A)), deceit 
(Section 6b(a)(1)(C)), or both.  But, none of these cases arise 
solely from a violation of Section 6b(a)(1)(B).  This 
undermines their persuasiveness here.10 
                                              
10 Our review of legislative history did not produce any 
explicit support for the Government’s position.  The Grain 
Futures Act of 1922, Section 5(c) (the forerunner to the 
provision in question in the Commodity Exchange Act) 
prevented only the “dissemination . . . of false or misleading 
or knowingly inaccurate reports.”  Grain Futures Act, ch. 369 
42 Stat. 998 (1922), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1.  The only hint to 
the scope of this provision is discerned from the objections of 
some legislators to the inclusion of the term “inaccurate” 
(originally not qualified as “knowingly inaccurate”) because 
it would criminalize inadvertent mistakes.  House 
Consideration, Amendment and Passage of H.R. 11843, 62 
Cong. Rec. 9447 (June 26, 1922).  Debate on the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 generally made it clear that Congress 
intended to expand the scope of measures in the Grain 
Futures Act that sought to protect the integrity of transactions 
in the futures market.  Hearings Before the Senate Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate on H.R. 
6772, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., (April 21-23, 1936) pp. 21-27.  
However, there is nothing in these materials to support the 
Government’s contention that the false report provision—that 
essentially replaced Section 5(c)—was imbued with the 
common law meaning of fraud or deceit.  The language and 
the structure of this set of provisions has remained largely 
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Moreover, Wang draws our attention to a case in 
which the Government argued against a materiality 
requirement in Section 6b(a)(1)(B).  United States v. Ashman, 
979 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 814 
(1993).  In Ashman, the defendant asserted on appeal that the 
District Court erred by leaving out a jury instruction on 
materiality, which he contended was an element of Section 
6b(a)(1)(B). 11  The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, 
agreeing with the Government that it should affirm the 
District Court’s ruling that materiality is not an element of 
this crime.  Id. at 488.12  The Government now distances itself 
                                                                                                     
unchanged since first codified.  See Commodity Exchange 
Act, ch. 545, 49 stat. 1491 (1936), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1.   
 
11 The Court of Appeals focused on the following excerpt of 
the District Court’s opinion.  “When you're talking about 
Section (B), to me, ... I don't know what is plainer than to say 
it is unlawful ... to, quote, ‘willfully make or cause to be made 
a false report.’  What that means to me is a simple thing. If 
you're making a report and you know that it is false, you are 
willfully making a false report, and it doesn't make any 
difference whether you are intending to cheat or defraud 
anybody or not.”  Ashman, 979 F.2d 487–88. 
 
12 The Board distinguished Ashman by noting that the issue 
considered there was whether the District Court properly 
instructed the jury.  We review jury instructions to “determine 
whether, ‘taken as a whole, they properly apprized the jury of 
the issues and the applicable law.’”  United States v. Yeaman, 
194 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 1999)(quoting Dressler v. Busch 
Entertainment Corp., 143 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 
1998))(emphasis added).  Therefore, we understand the Board 
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from this position, characterizing it as the product of 
insufficient legal analysis. 13  But at the very least, this case—
                                                                                                     
to be saying that Ashman is not persuasive as to the 
materiality issue because the ruling concerned the whole jury 
instruction, not just the elements of the crime.  But, the court 
in Ashman explicitly focused on the elements of Section 
6b(a)(1)(B) and so we do not share the Board’s concerns.  
The Board also attributed great significance to a reference 
made in Ashman to another case from the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, (United States v. Jackson, 836 F.2d 
324, 329 (7th Cir. 1987)), regarding it as evidence that 
Ashman actually ruled that materiality is an element of 
6b(a)(1)(B).  However, Jackson arose in the context of a 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 152 (giving false oaths in a 
bankruptcy proceeding) and is, therefore, distinguishable.  As 
a result, this mere reference to Jackson in Ashman—which, 
on its face, seems to have been inserted merely to support its 
handling of the District Court’s holding—is wholly 
unpersuasive as a basis to interpret the holding in Ashman. 
 
13 This argument is unpersuasive in light of our own review 
(see supra n. 10), and is further weakened by a recent 
Supreme Court decision in which the Government argued 
against the linkage between false statements and materiality.  
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1918, 1920–21 (2017).  
There, the District Court convicted the defendant with 
knowingly “procur[ing], contrary to law, [her] naturalization” 
(18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)) because she violated the law by 
“knowingly mak[ing] any false statement under oath.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1015(a).  Id.  The Government argued that the 
district court properly instructed a jury that materiality was 
not required to convict for making false statements in the 
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which focused directly on Section 6b(a)(1)(B)—undermines 
the Government’s efforts to persuade us that materiality has 
always been a presumptive element in false statement crimes 
under the CEA.  
 
 Moreover, under the rules of statutory construction, the 
presence of the term “defraud” in Section 6b(a)(1)(A) and 
“deceive” in Section 6b(a)(1)(C) suggests that Congress’ 
omission of these terms (or any such terms with an accepted 
common law meaning) in Section (B) was purposeful.  See 
Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 939 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Finally, we note that Congress used the word “material” in 
Section 6b(e)(2), setting forth crimes in the context of 
contracts of sale on group or index of securities.  Again, at the 
very least, it reminds us that Congress knew when and how to 
use this term when it was drafting the CEA.   
 
 All of this persuades us to give a natural reading to the 
words “false report or statement” in Section 6b(a)(1)(B), 
without importing the common law of deceit or fraud into our 
analysis, and without relying on the cases cited by the 
Government.  The words of the statute do not give us any 
basis to conclude that materiality is a required element of the 
offense.  Accordingly, for all of these reasons, we will hold 
                                                                                                     
course of applying for citizenship because no mention of 
materiality is made in the statutes.  Id.  The Court commented 
that a linkage of the false statement violation to the actual 
procurement of citizenship was necessary to avoid the absurd 
result where “some legal violations that do not justify denying 
citizenship under that definition would nonetheless justify 
revoking it later.”  Id. at 1926-27.   
 
 17 
 
that the Board erred by concluding Section 6b(a)(1)(B) 
requires evidence of materiality.14 
 
B. 
 Wang next maintains that the crime for which he was 
convicted does not meet the second requirement for an 
aggravated felony under the INA because it did not result in 
any loss.  INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (“an offense . . . in which 
the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”).  In 
contrast to our categorical analysis of the first requirement, 
we take a circumstance-specific approach here.  Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38-39 (2009).  The Supreme Court 
characterized the review as examining “the specific way in 
which an offender committed the crime on a specific 
occasion.”  Id. at 34.  Our review includes not only those 
documents that may be considered in a modified categorical 
approach (the indictment, plea agreement, and judgment), but 
may also include the presentence investigation report (Kaplun 
v. Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260, 266 
(3d Cir. 2010)) and any “sentencing-related material” 
(Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42) to enable us “to determine if the 
government has proved by ‘clear and convincing’ evidence 
that his offense involved an actual loss to a victim . . . that 
exceeds $10,000.”  Singh, 677 F.3d at 512.  Consideration of 
                                              
14 Our opinion today establishes that Wang’s statute of 
conviction under the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(B), does not 
require proof of “materiality.”  To be clear, any opinion the 
BIA may issue addressing whether materiality is imbedded in 
the term “fraud” or “deceit” in the INA does not and should 
not be viewed as extending to the CEA or the securities laws, 
generally. 
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these materials is appropriate so long as the petitioner has 
been given “a fair opportunity” to challenge the 
Government’s claim.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41. 
 
 The Government produced a record that included the 
following evidence.  A one-count superseding information 
alleged that after “Company 1” (Wang’s employer) 
discovered Wang had falsely recorded open futures contracts 
as closed, it liquidated them at a loss of $2.2 million.  Next, 
the District Court judge raised this allegation to Wang at the 
July 16, 2014, plea colloquy.  
  
Court:  Do you have any 
understanding as to the loss 
that was realized as a 
consequence of your false 
entries? 
 
Defendant:   I don’t know. 
 
Court:  Do you understand 
that the government 
contends that the loss was 
more than $1 million and 
less than $2.5 million?  
 
Defendant:   Yes. 
  
Hearing Transcript, 7/16/14, at 20, United States v. Fan Wang 
(14 Cr. 114) (S.D.N.Y. 2014), ECF No. 21.  The presentence 
investigation report detailed the following: 
 19 
 
Based on the FBI’s discussions 
with the Managing Partner, the 
FBI learned that on the morning 
of November 18, 2011, the 
Managing Partner learned that 
Company-1 had received a margin 
call from the Brokerage Firm for 
$1.2 million dollars related to 
Account-1.  . . . . The clerk’s 
review of Company 1’s records 
uncovered false entries that Wang 
had made on Company-1’s 
computerized records.  These 
entries concealed the 
unauthorized purchase on 
November 16, 2011, of 587 light 
crude oil futures contracts on 
Account-1.  Specifically, Wang 
made manual entries in Company-
1’s records that purported to show 
that the 587 positions were closed 
(i.e. sold), when in fact they were 
still open.  Reports reflecting 
these manual entries were 
transmitted in interstate 
commerce to Company-1’s 
accounting department located in 
Chicago, Illinois. . . . . Based on 
the FBI’s review of Company 1’s 
trading records, the FBI learned 
that Company-1 ultimately sold 
the 587 futures contracts 
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purchased by Wang for a loss of 
$2.2 million. 
 
Presentence Investigation Report, Rev. 9/9/14, at 7, United 
States v. Fan Wang (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14 Cr. 411).  
Finally, the November 19, 2014 judgment specified a “total 
loss” of $2.2 million.  Judgement, 11/17/14, at 5, United 
States v. Fan Wang (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14 Cr. 411).  The 
District Court ordered Wang to pay restitution in this amount. 
 
  Wang is convinced that the Government never proved 
that his crime (making false reports) caused the $2.2 million 
loss.  He makes a number of arguments to support this 
conclusion.  
  
 He first maintains that the Immigration Judge and the 
Board improperly treated the allegation on loss in the 
indictment as part of his admission of guilt at the time of his 
plea.  He says that he never admitted this,15 and declares that 
                                              
15 Wang characterizes the allegation of loss as “surplusage” 
because it was not necessary to prove the crime.  Relying on 
Valansi, he contends that, since this allegation was not 
necessary to the proof of his crime, his guilty plea alone is not 
enough to demonstrate that he admitted to every allegation in 
the indictment.  Valansi, 278 F.3d at 215-16.  We note that 
we conducted a modified categorical review in Valansi, not a 
circumstance-specific review.  But we appreciate Wang’s 
argument that the legitimacy of this general principle is not 
impacted by this contextual distinction.  
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he actually disputed it.16  Regardless of whether he admitted 
it, we disagree that the Board based its decision on a 
conclusion that Wang admitted to the loss.  There is nothing 
in the record to support this, and the Board specifically 
affirmed the Immigration Judge’s reliance on the District 
Court’s judgment specifying a total loss amount. 
 
 Next, Wang stresses that the “loss must be tied to the 
specific counts covered by the conviction.”  Nijhawan, 557 
U.S. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).17   
He then attacks the Board’s use of the District Court’s 
reference to a total loss of $2.2 million in its judgment.  Wang 
says the loss was “surplusage” evidence (not necessary to 
prove the elements of his crime) and was, therefore, out of 
bounds.   
 
 He supports his characterization of the evidence on 
loss by pointing to the fact that the District Court considered 
it during sentencing while it was reviewing “relevant 
                                              
16 As for Wang’s assertion that he actually disputed the loss 
we note a subtle but significant distinction.  He argued during 
the sentencing hearing that the loss was not an actual loss 
because it was incurred by the company’s liquidation of the 
unauthorized contracts.  However, it is notable that he never 
challenged the truthfulness of the Government’s allegation 
that “Company 1” sold the futures contracts at a $2.2 million 
loss after discovering his false reporting. 
 
17 The Court also favorably cited Alaka that said the loss must 
be “tethered” to the offense.  Nijhawan¸557 U.S. at 42 (citing 
Alaka v. Attorney General of the United States, 456 F.3d 88, 
107 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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conduct” under United States Sentencing Guideline Manual 
§1B1.3.  See United States v. Pollard, 986 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“Relevant conduct” includes uncharged conduct, 
beyond the offense of conviction.).  He is convinced that a 
“surplus” allegation in an indictment, presented only as 
evidence of “relevant conduct” at sentencing, is plainly not 
tied to his convicted offense.  Therefore, according to Wang’s 
understanding of Nijhawan¸ it cannot be used as proof of loss 
for purpose of Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA.  
Although he is right that evidence of loss was not needed for 
his conviction, we disagree with the conclusions he draws 
from this. 
 
 First, the Supreme Court made clear that when the 
Board considers loss under Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the 
INA, it may go beyond evidence that is necessary to prove the 
elements of the crime and look at “the specific way in which 
an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion.”  
Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34.  It reasoned that, if the INA was 
interpreted as limiting the review of loss only to the evidence 
required for conviction in fraud crimes, it would effectively 
require “obtaining from a jury a special verdict on a fact that . 
. . is not an element of the offense.”  Id. at 42.  In practical 
terms, exclusion of sentencing-related materials would render 
Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) virtually inapplicable to fraud 
crimes committed in jurisdictions that did not specify the 
$10,000 threshold as an element of the crime.  Id. at 40.   
 
 Moreover, in this case, Wang had ample opportunity to 
challenge this evidence.  Id. at 41.  For these reasons, it is 
clear that even though evidence of loss was not required for 
conviction, it was not beyond the limits of the Board’s review 
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as it deliberated on whether a crime is an aggravated felony 
under the INA. 
 
 But Wang’s argument goes further, demanding that we 
scrutinize whether the Government’s reliance on this 
particular District Court judgment to meet its burden of proof 
is consistent with the INA’s definition of loss.  See, e.g., 
Singh, 677 F.3d at 511.18  To justify the inquiry Wang 
segregates his unauthorized purchases of futures contracts 
(uncharged conduct) from his false reports on those purchases 
(conduct grounding his conviction) and argues that his 
employer’s loss resulted only from his purchases, not his 
reports.  The point of Wang’s facile distinction is to tie the 
loss exclusively to uncharged conduct in the hope that, in this 
case, it will place it outside the definition of loss under the 
INA, even if it was relevant conduct for purposes of 
sentencing.  Among the difficulties for Wang is that the 
Government presented this same evidence differently and 
more compellingly.  
 
                                              
18In Singh, we said:  “The statutory language of subparagraph 
(M)(i) provides no indication that Congress wanted loss to be 
defined in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines. As the 
Kharana concurrence observed, the Guidelines and the INA 
are like “apples and oranges.” See Kharana, 487 F.3d [1280, 
1287 (9th Cir. 2008)] (Wallace, J., concurring). Not only are 
they written by different bodies (one by a non-legislative 
commission, one by Congress), but they serve distinctly 
different purposes (one penological, one civil).”  Singh, 677 
F.3d at 511. 
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 The Government asserts that there is a direct link 
between Wang’s crime and the loss because his false reports 
covered up his unauthorized purchases.  By asserting this 
connection the Government is not denying that Wang’s 
purchases were part of a causal chain that resulted in a loss.  
Rather, it is simply stating that the $2.2 million loss is 
undeniably tethered to the conduct for which Wang was 
convicted.19  This is a convincing argument primarily because 
it avoids strained distinctions, and it plainly describes “the 
specific way in which [the] offender committed the crime on 
[this] specific occasion.”  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34.  For 
these reasons, we are confident that the Board properly 
considered evidence of the $2.2 million loss, and that the 
Government met its burden of providing clear and convincing 
evidence that this loss is tied to the crime for which Wang 
was convicted. 
 
IV. 
 For all of these reasons, we will grant Wang’s Petition 
for Review as to the Board’s determination that he committed 
a crime involving fraud or deceit.  We will remand this case 
to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
                                              
19 The presentence investigation report substantiates this.  
Moreover, as we observed supra, n. 14, Wang has never 
challenged the fact that his former employer incurred a $2.2 
million loss from liquidating the contracts he purchased.  He 
only has disputed that the loss is tied to his false report 
conduct.   
